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THE COMPATIBILITY OF DIVINE DETERMINISM 
AND HUMAN FREEDOM: A MODEST PROPOSAL 
David P. Hunt 
I begin by developing an argument for the conclusion that God's 
causally determining everything we do is compatible with human free-
dom. Libertarian theists (and not just libertarians) will suspect that 
something must be wrong with the argument. They are right, and T 
explain why. I then point out that certain influential arguments for the 
conclusion that God's foreknowing everything we do is compatible with 
human freedom are in the same logical boat as this fallacious argu-
ment. I look closely at tvvo of these, showing how they go astray. I 
conclude with some morals suggested by this cautionary tale. 
Since omnipotence concerns only power and says nothing about its exer-
cise, a being might be omnipotent even if it never actually did anything. 
Such a being would obviously not be God, who is (among other things) 
creator of the universe. l But how much of an omnipotent being's powers 
must the being exercise in order to count as God? Some theists will be 
inclined to impose relatively minimal requirements on the deployment 
of God's omnipotent powers, while others can be expected to take the 
opposite tack. The latter position is probably more interesting from a 
metaphysical standpoint (leaving it for now an open question whether it 
is interestingly true or interestingly false!). It is therefore worth consid-
ering how a "maximalist" answer to this question might be defended, 
and what morals might be drawn from the success or failure of this 
defense. 
I 
If an omnipotent being is one that can do anything (that is doable), an 
"omnificent" being (let us say) is one that does do everything (that is done). 
This is, of course, the merest gesture in the direction of an adequate con-
cept; there is no reason to think that a philosophically sound analysis of 
II omnificence" would be any easier to obtain, or any less fraught with con-
troversy, than the corresponding analysis of omnipotence.2 For the pur-
poses of this paper, however, the following may be sufficient elaboration: 
A being X is omnificent iff everything Y that happens is such that X 
uniquely determines Y to happen, i.e., something X does is (causally) 
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sufficient for Y to happen, and nothing else is (causally) sufficient for 
Y to happen.3 
With the concept of omnificence so understood, we can state our maximal-
ist response to the question as follows: for a being to count as God, the 
being must be not only omnipotent but also omnificent. 
How should this "doctrine of divine omnificence" be received? The fact 
is that it has a number of things going for it. It fits well with the 
Aristotelian view that God is pure actuality; it sanctions a straightforward 
approach to God's role as Ultimate Explainer; it provides a superlative 
foundation for divine sovereignty and providence; and it enjoys other 
advantages as well. There is one consideration, however, that would 
appear to trump this doctrine's manifold merits. If God does everylhing, 
then creatures do nothing; and if there is no free agency (other than God's), 
there is no moral responsibility (other than God's). This is a religiously 
(not to mention humanistically) unacceptable consequence. It is for this 
reason, presumably, that theists who might otherwise find much to attract 
them in the doctrine of divine omnificence-theists like, for example, the 
great medieval theologians Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas, and the great 
Reformers Luther and Calvin-approach this doctrine only asymptotically, 
as it were, seeking in the end to distinguish it from their own positions, or 
at least to qualify it in such a way that human responsibility is somehow 
preserved. 
But perhaps this skittishness in the face of divine omnificence is urlwar-
ranted. Theists, no less than nontheists, like to have their cake and eat it 
whenever possible, and this is arguably a case in which it is indeed possible. 
Let's first restate the problem a bit more carefully. If God is omnificent, 
omnificence is presumably one of His essential attributes; so God would be 
omnificent in every world in which He exists. Moreover, there is no world 
in which He does not exist. So 
(a) God exists in all possible worlds and is omnificent in all possi-
ble worlds. 
Now consider some presumptive instance of agency whose freedom we 
may fear threatened by the doctrine of divine omnificence-say, 
(b) Adam freely eats of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. 
If (b) is true, then so is 
(c) Adam eats of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. 
But given (a) and the analysis of 'omnificence', it follows from (c) that 
(d) God uniquely determines Adam to eat of the tree of the knowl-
edge of good and evil. 
And (d), the theological faint-hearts affirm, is inconsistent with (b), at least 
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on any robustly libertarian understanding of what it is for someone to do 
something freely. 
If the following argument is sound, however, this concern would 
appear to be misplaced. Whatever one might think about the consistency 
of (b) and (d), surely (b) and (c) are consistent with each other. Given that 
(b) entails (c), these two propositions could be inconsistent only if (b) were 
logically impossible. But no one who is seriously concerned that divine 
omnificence threatens creaturely free agency will allow that (b) is logically 
impossible, since in that case there could be no Adamic freedom for divine 
omnificence to threaten. But if (b) and (c) are consistent, then so are (b) and 
(d)-at least on the assumption of divine omnificence. For given (a), 
propositions (c) and (d) are strictly equivalent to each other-there is no log-
ically possible world in which one is true and the other is false. But if (d) is 
strictly equivalent to (c), and (c) is consistent with (b), it follows necessarily 
that (b) is consistent with (d). There is no good reason, then, to reject the 
doctrine of divine omnificence---at least there is no good reason rooted in a 
concern for creaturely free agency. 
Call this defense of divine omnificence 'The Proposal.' Since the advan-
tages of divine omnificence are real, and The Proposal shows this doc-
trine's only identified disadvantage to be bogus, theists ought to embrace 
divine omnificence. 
II 
I don't suppose for a moment that The Proposal is really sound. This is a 
"modest proposal" in the Swiftian sense: the compatibility of divine omnif-
icence with libertarian freedom and the argument just used to demonstrate 
this compatibility are about as worthy of serious acceptance as Jonathan 
Swift's satirical proposal for alleviating the famine in Ireland and the 
sophistical arguments he marshaled on behalf of this scheme. But if this is 
correct (and it surely is), where exactly does The Proposal go astray?4 
At the heart of The Proposal is an argument of this form: 
(1) P is consistent with q 
(2) q is strictly equivalent to r 
therefore 
(3) P is consistent with r 
There are at least a couple of ways of interpreting the propositional rela-
tions which occur in this argument-form, and the surface plausibility of 
The Proposal not surprisingly turns on the resulting equivocation. 
One univocal reading of these relations goes something like this (call 
this the" A-reading"): 
(lA) There is nothing about p, just by itself, which rules out the pos-
sibility that q is also true. 
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(2A) There is no difference in the informational content of q and r-
they constitute the very same fact. 
Therefore 
(3A) There is nothing about p, just by itself, which rules out the pos-
sibility that r is also true. 
This is the more colloquial of the two readings, and it is correspondingly 
less precise. What exactly is "informational content," and what are its 
identity conditions? And what is it to take a fact "just by itself" -espe-
cially when considering this fact's implications for some other fact? But 
the penumbra of vagueness surrounding these concepts is not so murky 
as to render this argument-form unusable. If q and r are the very same 
fact, any proposition that does not effectively exclude the possibility of q 
cannot effectively exclude the possibility of r. This is surely a valid 
inference, even if there are outstanding questions about how best to ana-
lyze the inference. 
Here is the other univocal reading (call this the "B-reading"): 
(1B) There is a possible world in which p and q are both true. 
(2B) In every possible world q and r have the same truth-value. 
Therefore 
(3B) There is a possible world in which p and r are both true. 
This argument-form, too, is valid. Moreover, it's clearly different from the 
A-reading, and the difference is not merely verbal. For example, when q = 
2+2=5 and r = James is a married bachelor, (2B) is true (because q and r are both 
necessarily false) but (2A) seems not to be true: surely q and r cannot be say-
ing the same thing (can they?), since the one is about arithmetical relations 
between numbers and the other is about the marital status of a person. 
Likewise, when p = Caesar died in 44 Be and q = There is a greatest prime num-
ber, (1B) is false, since there is no possible world in which there is a greatest 
prime number, and so a fortiori there is no possible world in which there is a 
greatest prime number and Caesar died in 44 BC But given this same valua-
tion for p and q, (lA) is intuitively true: while the existence of a greatest 
prime number is indeed inconsistent with certain facts, the facts with which 
it is inconsistent are the various axioms and lemmas making up the premises 
of the Prime Number Theorem, not the fact of Caesar dying in 44 BC 
Given these two valid but distinct argument-forms, which one offers the 
best way of understanding The Proposal? This question turns out to be 
moot, since neither one yields a sound argument. Substituting (b) for p, (c) 
for q, and (d) for r, the A-reading becomes 
(la) There is nothing about Adam freely eats of the tree of the knowledge 
of good and evil, just by itself, which rules out the possibility that 
Adam eats of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is also true. 
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(2a) There is no difference in the informational content of Adam eats 
of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and God determines 
Adam to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil-they con-
stitute the very same fact. 
Therefore 
(3a) There is nothing about Adam freely eats of the tree of the knowledge 
of good and evil, just by itself, which rules out the possibility that 
God determines Adam to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and 
evil is also true. 
So interpreted, there is absolutely nothing to recommend the second 
premise of the argument.s 
Perhaps the A-reading's failure is rooted in its relative lack of logical 
precision, and the argument will show itself to better effect when the 
notions of 'consistency' and' equivalence' are cashed out in terms of possi-
ble worlds. Here, then, is the B-reading: 
(lb) There is a possible world in which Adam freely eats of the tree of 
the knowledge of good and evil and Adam eats of the tree of the knowl-
edge of good and evil are both true. 
(2b) In every possible world Adam eats of the tree of the knowledge of 
good and C'ui! and God uniquely determines Adam to eat of the tree of 
the knowledge of good and evil have the same truth-value. 
Therefore 
(3b) There is a possible world in which Adam freely eats of the tree of 
the knowledge of good and evil and God uniquely determines Adam to 
eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil are both true. 
This argument is perhaps not so obviously defective as its A-reading coun-
terpart, but it fails nonetheless. The argument is supposed to refute the 
critie of divine omnifieence who objects that universal divine determinism 
is incompatible with creaturely libertarian freedom. According to this crit-
ie, if the doctrine of divine omnifieence is true, there is no world in which 
Adam (or anyone) freely does anything. But in that case (lb) is clearly 
false. Insofar, then, as The Proposal appeals to (lb) as a premise, it simply 
begs the question against the critic of divine omnificence. 
The Proposal is seductive because it's easy to miss the equivocation that 
occurs when one's attention shifts from the truth of its premises to the valid-
ity of its inference. 'Consistency' has a well-established meaning in ordi-
nary language and it is therefore natural to construe the first premise in 
accordance with the A-reading, on which it is true; 'strict equivalence' is a 
term of art and it is therefore natural to construe the second premise in 
accordance with the B-reading, on which it is also true. Anyone approach-
ing The Proposal in a spirit of charity will therefore find it easy to interpret 
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the premises so that both are true. As to whether the conclusion follows 
from the premises, the most straightforward way to operationalize the 
notion of 'consistency' when assessing the argument's validity is in the 
explicitly modal terms provided by the B-reading, and on this interpretation 
The Proposal is clearly valid. Unfortunately the B-reading of premise one is 
not a neutral paraphrase displaying the meaning of this premise and differ-
ing from the A-reading only in its greater analytical utility; it is an alternative 
to the meaning provided by the A-reading, and it is on the A-reading that 
this premise was judged to be true. In fact (as we have seen), the opponent 
of divine omnificence who regards (la) as unexceptionable, and on those 
groLmds concedes the first premise, does not accept (lb)-indeed, her very 
reason for opposing divine omnificence commits her to the position that, if 
God is omnificent, (lb) is false. 
III 
No one to my knowledge has embraced The Proposal, at least not in the 
bald fashion in which it has been presented here. What makes it worth 
refuting is that similar arguments crop up in other contexts. The contem-
porary debate over the compatibility of human freedom and divine omni-
science provides an especially rich breeding ground for such arguments. I 
want now to look at two examples of compatibility arguments which, 
though they concern omniscience rather than omnificence, nevertheless 
belong to the same logical family as The Proposal. One of these is The 
Proposal's identical twin, while the other is merely a close relation. 
The first example comes from Ted Warfield, so let's call it 'Warfield's 
Argument. '6 Warfield's Argument is directed against "theological incom-
patibilists" whose doubts about the compatibility of divine omniscience 
and human freedom rest on grounds of the following sort. Given the tradi-
tional doctrine of divine omniscience, 
(ex) God exists in all possible worlds and is omniscient in all possi-
ble worlds. 
Now consider some presumptive instance of agency whose freedom we 
may fear threatened by the doctrine of divine omniscience--say, 
(P) Plantinga will freely climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD. 
If (b) is true, then so is 
(y) It was true in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore 
in 2000 AD. 
But given (ex), it follows from (y) that 
(D) God knew in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore 
in 2000 AD. 
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The theological incompatibilist then avers that (p) and (b) are inconsistent 
with each other. In defense of this claim, the incompatibilist appeals to 
some version of a familiar argument, dating back at least to St. Augustine 
and revived in a particularly powerful form by Nelson Pike,B to the effect 
that, necessarily, Plantinga (i) can fail to climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 
AD if (P) is true, but (ii) cannot fail to climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD if 
(b) is true; hence (P) and (b) are not cotenable. Call this argument for theo-
logical incompatibilism, in its most cogent form (whatever that might be), 
the AT!. 
Warfield's strategy in responding to the foregoing concern is to ignore 
the ATI and construct instead a direct defense of the consistency of (P) and 
(6). This defense is identical in form to the one The Proposal offers on 
behalf of the consistency of (b) and (d); that is, Warfield's Argument 
employs the argument-form 
(1) P is consistent with q 
(2) q is strictly equivalent to r 
therefore 
(3) P is consistent with r9 
But for p Warfield's Argument substitutes (P) instead of The Proposal's (b); 
for q it substitutes (y) instead of (X); and for r it substitutes (6) instead of (d). 
In defense of the relevant substitution-instance of (1), Warfield notes that 
he is not offering an argument against the "logical fatalist," for whom the 
denial of (P) is supposed to follow from (y) alone. Rather, he is defending 
the foreknowledge component of the doctrine of divine omniscience from 
concerns that have been raised within the ongoing debate over divine fore-
knowledge, and there is (he avers) "no participant in the foreknowledge 
debate (compatibilist or incompatibilist) who does not accept the falsity of 
logical fatalism." For tills reason, he adds, "[r]elevant interlocutors ... have 
no room to disagree with tills assumption."10 
It should be clear from our analysis of The Proposal what is wrong with 
this line. The "relevant interlocutors" agree with Warfield that the exis-
tence of true future-tense propositions about human actions does not by 
itself have any deleterious consequences for human freedom. But tills only 
means that they accept the first premise of Warfield's Argument under the 
A-reading, which parses the argument as follows: 
(1 a) There is nothing about Plantinga will freely climb Mount 
Rushmore in 2000 AD, just by itself, willch rules out the possibili-
ty that It was true in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount 
Rushmore in 2000 AD is also true. 
(2a) There is no difference in the informational content of It was true 
in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD 
and God knew in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore 
in 2000 AD-they constitute the very same fact. 
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Therefore 
(3a) There is nothing about Plantinga will freely climb Mount 
Rushmore in 2000 AD, just by itself, which rules out the possibili-
ty that God knew in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount 
Rushmore in 2000 AD is also true. 
But (2a) is prima facie absurd: on the A-reading, the second premise of 
Warfield's Argument is no more acceptable than the second premise of 
The Proposal.11 
This leaves the B-reading, which Warfield himself clearly favors. So 
construed, Warfield's Argument looks like this: 
(1~) There is a possible world in which Plantinga will freely climb 
Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD and It was true in 50 AD that 
Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 are both true. 
(2~) In every possible world It was true in 50 AD that Plantinga will 
climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD and God knew in 50 AD that 
Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD have the same 
truth-value. 
Therefore 
(3~) There is a possible world in which Plantinga will freely climb 
Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD and God knew in 50 AD that 
Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 are both true. 
But why should this rendition have any more bite for the "relevant inter-
locutors" than the A-Reading? Theological incompatibilists, after all, will 
either deny (1~) or regard it as the very point at issue, given the doctrine of 
divine omniscience. 
Warfield has recently responded in this journal to two published cri-
tiques of his argument.12 One comes from William Hasker,13 who claims 
(among other things) that Warfield's Argument assumes (~) to be logically 
possible. Warfield's counterclaim is that (~)'s logical possibility is not an 
"assumption" but "a strict consequence of something Hasker and I both 
accept, namely, that [(~)] and [(y)] are compatible," adding: "I assume that 
there is nothing dialectically inappropriate in accepting a proposition 
implied by a claim of my opponent."14 
But Hasker and like-minded critics of divine foreknowledge clearly do 
not accept that there is a logically possible world in which (~) is true if (a) is 
true, so a fortiori they do not accept that there is a logically possible world 
in which both (~) and (y) are true if (a) is true. What they can be expected 
to accept, given their rejection of logical fatalism, is the A-reading of the 
first premise, and this reading is useless to Warfield's Argument. It is of 
course open to Warfield to dismiss the A-reading's construals of 'consisten-
cy' and 'strict equivalence', perhaps on the grounds that they are not suffi-
ciently well-behaved from a logical standpoint to be countenanced in polite 
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philosophical conversation. But then Warfield should be questioning 
whether and in what sense his opponents really accept the first premise of 
Warfield's Argument, not attributing to them a reading of this premise 
which their very position commits them to rejecting. 
The other critique comes from Anthony Brueckner," who points out that 
there are bad arguments for true conclusions, and that a person can there-
fore reject the standard arguments for logical fatalism without thereby 
accepting that there are any possible worlds containing instances of free 
agency. (Such persons might think that free agency is impossible because 
they think that the relevant concept of 'freedom' is incoherent, or because 
they subscribe to some metaphysical position like divine omnificence or 
the principle of sufficient reason that they regard as incompatible with free 
agency.) Warfield's response is that Brueckner's point, while undeniable, 
fails to connect with anything in Warfield's Argument. The relevant 
premise of this argument is that (~) and (y) are consistent, not merely that a 
certain argument from (y) to the denial of (~) is unsuccessful. Since his 
opponent accepts the consistency claim, Warfield maintains that he is enti-
tled to use this claim in arguing against the opponent. 
Unfortunately Warfield's entitlement to this claim, even under the favor-
able B-reading, makes absolutely no difference to the success of his argu-
ment. Suppose Warfield's target audience is limited just to those who agree 
that there is a possible world in which (~) is true. This audience will assent 
to the conditional, if(a) is true, then there is a possible world in which (~) and 
(8) are both true. But part of this audience-the very part that Warfield is 
trying to win over-has (in the A TI) what it regards as good reasons for 
thinking that there is no possible world in which (~) and (8) are both true; 
moreover, there is nothing in Warfield's Argument that so much as address-
es let alone refutes these reasons. For this audience the above conditional is 
the first step in a modus tollens argument demonstrating the untenability of 
(a), not a modus ponens proving the consistency of (~) and (8). In the end, 
Warfield's Argument simply begs the question against the opposition.16 
IV 
Warfield's Argument provided the model I used when constructing The 
Proposal, so it's not surprising that it fails in exactly the same way. Similar 
Proposal-like efforts to reduce theological to logical fatalism have been 
made by Susan Haack, who regards the former as "no more than a need-
lessly (and confusingly) elaborated version of the argument for fatalism 
discussed by Aristotle in de Interpretatione 9,1/17 and by William Lane Craig. IS 
It's not clear that an analysis of these arguments would add much to what 
has already been said about Warfield's Argument. I suggest then that we 
turn for our second example to an argument put forward by Alvin 
Plantinga-call it 'Plantinga's Argument' -which exhibits a bit more varia-
tion on the theme.19 
Plantinga's Argument is like Warfield's in a number of respects: (i) it is 
directed against theological incompatibilists who deny the consistency of 
(~) and (8) on grounds provided by the A TI; (ii) it is designed to settle a 
key dispute in favor of the A TI' s critics while avoiding a direct engage-
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ment with the ATI's defenders; and (iii) the theological incompatibilists 
who constitute the "relevant interlocutors" for the argument are those who 
agree with Plantinga that logical fatalism is a nonstarter. But instead of 
resting his argument, like Warfield, on the agreed consistency of (~) and 
(y), Plantinga appeals to other common ground he shares with his oppo-
nents, namely, the judgment that (y) is a so-called "soft fact" about the past. 
For readers unfamiliar with the hard facti soft fact distinction and its rele-
vance to fatalism, a little background is in order. 
If the (logical or theological) fatalist's argument has the form 
P, O(P::JQ), I:. OQ, 
it commits a modal fallacy, but if it takes the valid form 
OP, O(P::JQ), I:. OQ 
the fatalist must justify premising P as necessary. If P is a so-called "hard" 
fact about the past-one that is genuinely and solely about the pasfO-the 
premise is arguably justifiable: relative to the present, P would be "acci-
dentally" or "temporally" necessary (not even God, Aquinas notes, can 
undo the pasf1). Such necessity would validly "transfer" to Q, and this 
implication of the future in the necessity of the past is precisely what the 
fatalist is after. (As Richard Taylor, a card-carrying logical fatalist, suc-
cinctly explains, "A fatalist ... thinks of the future in the way we all think 
of the past."22) But if P is only a "soft" fact about the past-if it is only 
superficially about the past, or concerns the future as well as the past-
then oP is unavailable as a premise. Indeed, those who reject logical fatal-
ism typically do so because they agree that the facts that play P's role in the 
logical fatalist's argument-facts like 
(y) It was true in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore 
in 2000 AD 
-are paradigmatically "soft" facts about the past. (One may also avoid 
logical fatalism by denying that there are any such facts as (y), whether 
hard or soft; but then neither could an omniscient God know such facts, 
making this strategy unavailable to defenders of divine foreknowledge.) 
Plantinga is therefore entitled to assume that his theological incompatibilist 
opponents who reject logical fatalism will agree with him that propositions 
like (y) may be true (since otherwise divine omniscience would not include 
the problematic foreknowledge) and that, when true, they constitute mere 
soft facts about the past (since otherwise there would be a good argument 
for logical fatalism). 
With this common ground secured, Plantinga's Argument proceeds as 
follows. For divine foreknowledge to be incompatible with human free-
dom, at least on the grounds cited by the ATI, God's foreknowledge of 
creatures' putatively free future actions must be expressible as a hard fact 
about the past. Because God's past beliefs about the future count as knowl-
edge only in virtue of the future turning out as God believed it would, 
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(8) God knew in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore 
in 2000 AD 
is not itself a hard fact about the past. For this reason a sophisticated theo-
logical incompatibilist would appeal instead to 
(8') God believed in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore 
in 2000 AD, 
a proposition that would appear to depend for its truth only on the charac-
ter of God's past cognitive states and so to constitute a genuinely hard fact 
about the past. But Plantinga has an argument to show that (8') no less 
than (8) must be a soft fact about the past. The relevant interlocutors agree 
that (y) is a soft fact about the past. But given that 
(a) God exists in all possible worlds and is omniscient in all possi-
ble worlds, 
(y) is strictly equivalent to (8'). Since (y) is a soft fact about the past and (y) 
is strictly equivalent to (8'), it follows that (8') is also a soft fact about the 
past. But this undercuts the theological incompatibilist's only ground for 
supposing that (8') is necessary (prior to 2000 AD), and without such 
necessity, the AT! cannot succeed. By misidentifying the crucial fact about 
the past as hard, the argument for theological fatalism turns out to involve 
the same mistake as the argument for logical fatalism. 
Plantinga's Argument employs the inference-form 
(1 *) q is a soft fact about the past 
(2) q is strictly equivalent to r 
therefore 
(3*) r is a soft fact about the past, 
with q = (y) and r = (8'). Is this inference-form valid, and does it remain 
valid when its premises are interpreted so that they come out true? 
Leaving aside the multiple ways of interpreting 'soft fact' in (1*) and (3*), 
substitution-instances of (2) are susceptible to the same two readings as the 
second premise of Warfield's Argument. The A-reading of (2), on which q 
and r are the very same fact, does make it virtually undeniable that, if q is a 
soft fact, r must be a soft fact as well (for any plausible interpretation of 
'soft fact'); so construed, the argument-form is surely valid. Unfortunately 
the relevant substitution-instance of (2), namely, 
(2a) There is no difference in the informational content of It was true 
in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD 
and God knew in 50 AD that Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore 
in 2000 AD-they constitute the very same fact, 
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is just as surely false, since the one fact concerns what Plantinga will do and 
the other concerns what God cognized.23 
The corresponding B-reading of this premise, namely, 
(2~) In every possible world It was true in 50 AD that Plantinga will 
climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD and God knew in 50 AD that 
Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in 2000 AD have the same 
truth-value, 
is not similarly dubious (given (a)), but the resulting argument is now of 
doubtful validity. For one thing, it's not at all clear that having the same 
truth-value in every possible world (as opposed to being the same fact) is 
enough to make r a soft fact just because q is a soft fact. This would, at the 
very least, require some argument.24 But even if this inference were grant-
ed, there would still be no reason to employ it in the modus ponens favored 
by Plantinga rather than the modus tollens favored by his opponents. The 
incompatibilist, after all, has offered reasons for thinking that (8') cannot be 
a soft fact about the past.25 If (ex) is true and the set of soft facts is closed 
under strict equivalence, these reasons for thinking that (8') cannot be a 
soft fact about the past become reasons for thinking that (y) cannot be a soft 
fact about the past. But the "relevant interlocutors" all agree that (y) is a 
soft fact. Why then shouldn't they conclude, so much the worse for (a)? 
Plantinga's Argument, like Warfield's, provides the incompatibilist with 
no grounds for revising this judgment. 26 
A paradoxical feature of these various efforts to use some substitution-
instance of (2) to preserve human freedom from divine determinism, 
whether it is determinism arising from God's exercise of power (as in The 
Proposal) or from His knowledge of the future (as in Warfield's Argument 
and Plantinga's Argument), is that a less maximalist line on these divine 
attributes might make the threat to human freedom more serious. If there is 
only "local" omnificence or omniscience-if, for example, everything that I 
do, but not everything that everyone does, is uniquely determined or infalli-
bly foreknown by God-nothing in these various arguments is even rele-
vant to showing that the affected agents remain free?7 If there are cogent 
grounds for thinking that freedom is abridged when divine determinism 
makes God the true cause of an action or when divine foreknowledge pre-
cludes all alternatives to the action (and the grounds for the latter, at least, 
are admittedly controversial), these grounds should remain cogent as more 
and more of what happens gets done by God, and more and more of the 
future gets fixed by God's foreknowledge. But according to the compati-
bility arguments we have been considering, things get worse for human 
freedom only until God's agency and/or knowledge achieve complete 
ubiquity across events and worlds, at which point the relevant instance of 
(2) becomes true and my freedom (and everyone else's) is suddenly 
restored. This claim is (to say the least) highly counterintuitive. 
It's not clear what the defenders of these arguments could say to make 
this result seem even half-way plausible, but the arguments' critics may 
suspect where the problem lies. If God's essential omnificence or omni-
science means that His uniquely determining Adam to eat, or His infallibly 
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foreknowing that Plantinga will climb, is nothing more than the fact of 
Adam's eating or Plantinga's climbing, then it's hardly surprising that 
these facts about God should have no deleterious implications for human 
freedom. But it's also hard to see how' omnificence' and 'omniscience', on 
this account, would be more than empty names, or why it should matter 
theologically whether God possesses these attributes. 
v 
Responding to Hasker's charge that he simply assumes the truth of (ex), 
Warfield claims that he assumes it only for the purpose of conditional 
proof, using it to "show that the consistency of [(~)] and [(8)] follows ... in 
just the way that one might argue that causal determinism is incompatible 
with human freedom by assuming the truth of determinism and deriving a 
'no freedom' conclusion."28 But in fact this is precisely how Warfield's 
opponents, the theological incompatibilists, make their case: by assuming 
the truth of divine omniscience and deriving a "no freedom" conclusion. 
The proper parallel to Warfield's brief for theological compatibilism would 
be a (nontheological) compatibilist who replies to the defender of an 
incompatibilist argument, like Peter van Inwagen's "Consequences 
Argument,"29 as follows: 
You and I both agree that (i) there are instances of free agency. I 
believe, in addition, that (ii) universal causal determinism is true. 
You claim that I should reject (ii) because it is incompatible with (i). 
Au contraire, man frere! Given (ii), to which I am entitled for the sake 
of argument, and then adding (i), which you cannot begrudge me 
because you accept it yourself, it follows that (i) is compatible with (ii). 
This absurd petitio principii simply ignores all van Inwagen's reasons for 
thinking that causal determinism and freedom of will are not compatible. 
Likewise Warfield's Argument simply ignores all the reasons theological 
incompatibilists like Jonathan Edwards (who resolves the incompatibility 
one way) and William Hasker (who resolves it the other way) have 
offered for thinking that infallible foreknowledge and free agency are not 
compatible. 
Call this type of defense, whose general form is given by omitting the 
specific content of (i) and (ii) in the indented passage above, 'The Shorter 
Proposal'. (Of its omniscience-version Hasker rightly notes that it does 
"everything Warfield's original argument does, with somewhat greater 
economy."30) An apparent example of The Shorter Proposal may be found 
in Augustine's classic discussion of the problem of divine foreknowledge 
v. human freedom in Book III of On Free Choice of the Will, when at the end 
of chapter 3 he summarizes the results of his investigation as follows: 
Thus, we believe both that God has foreknowledge of everything in 
the future and that nonetheless we will whatever we will. Since God 
foreknows our will, the very will that he foreknows will be what 
comes about. Therefore, it will be a will, since it is a will that he fore-
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knows. And it could not be a will unless it were in our power. 
Therefore, he also foreknows this power. It follows, then, that his 
foreknowledge does not take away my power, since he whose fore-
knowledge never errs foreknows that I will have it.3! 
In other words, if we begin by assuming (free) will, the truth about reality 
will include truths about future freely-willed actions; and if we further 
assume an omniscient deity, he will obviously foreknow these truths, since 
otherwise he would not know everything. Treated as an argument for the 
compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, this passage 
from Augustine clearly assumes the very point at issue. 
Augustine does, however, do something that Warfield does not do: he 
goes on (in chapter 4) to explain how it is, by his lights, that the AT! goes 
wrong. The fact that he resolves the problem (to his satisfaction) in chapter 
4 is some reason to think that he does not do so in chapter 3, and that the 
quoted passage must therefore play some other role in his exposition. 
Elsewhere I have argued that Augustine's real objective in chapter 3 is to 
encourage in the reader a lively sense that this (so far unresolved) problem 
is merely aporetic in nature.32 For example, when responding to someone 
tempted to accept Zeno's Achilles argument, the first step might be to 
remind this person of everything that is implausible about Zeno's conclu-
sion, thereby encouraging the suspicion that there must be something 
wrong with the argument; and this first step might be accomplished suc-
cessfully without its contributing anything at all to the second step, which 
would be the actual unmasking of the fallacy on which the argument rests. 
Likewise, one of Augustine's points in chapter 3 (including the passage 
quoted above) is that knowledge per se does not appear to make any differ-
ence to its objects: given a situation 5, adding knowledge to 5 ought to 
leave the original features of 5 exactly as they were. If the truth is that 
Plantinga freely climbs, one would expect divine omniscience (absent some 
other exercise of divine power) to simply track this truth. There is some-
thing deeply baffling, then, about the idea that divine foreknowledge alone 
could overturn the freedom of what might otherwise be a paradigmatic 
instance of free agency.33 
That it's baffling is not, of course, a proof that it is false. (There are many 
baffling truths, and the preemption of human freedom by divine fore-
knowledge might be one of these.) Nor, for that matter, does the experien-
tial evidence against Zeno's conclusion demonstrate the falsity of the 
Parmenidean metaphysics for which Zeno was arguing. These are matters 
for further argument. Augustine supplies this further argument in chapter 
4. His resolution of the foreknowledge problem turns out to anticipate 
Harry Frankfurt's position that a person who cannot do otherwise may 
nevertheless be free in the sense required for moral responsibility so long 
as the conditions which eliminated the person's alternatives "played no 
role at all in leading him to act as he did," so that in their absence "[h]e 
would have acted the same."34 Divine foreknowledge, Augustine argues, 
is just such an alternative-eliminator ("God's foreknowledge does not force 
the future to happen"), and its implications for free will are benign.3' 
My purpose here is not to defend Augustine's particular solution to the 
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problem, which I have undertaken elsewhere (and which in any case 
would require much more than the two sentences at the end of the preced-
ing paragraph!), but to contrast his approach with the fallacious blandish-
ments of The Proposal and its ilk. Libertarians like Plantinga and Warfield 
who are compatibilists about human freedom and divine omnscience are 
presumably incompatibilists about human freedom and divine omnifi-
cence. If they are right on both counts (and I believe that they are), this 
must be in virtue of some difference between omniscience and omnifi-
cence. Justifying their position requires identifying this difference and 
explaining why it makes a difference. Their own arguments, which side-
step this issue, fail to engage their opponents' arguments, leaving them 
vulnerable to The Proposal and its defense of divine omnificence. 
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